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Reducing Burglary Initiative Evaluation
The Reducing Burglary Initiative
In 1998 the Home Office announced the Crime Reduction Programme. The programme was
intended to develop and implement an integrated approach to reducing crime and making
communities safer. The Reducing Burglary Initiative (RBI), launched in 1999, was one of the
first parts of this programme to commence. 
The aims of the RBI are to: 
l reduce burglary nationally by targeting areas with the worst domestic burglary problems; 
  evaluate the cost effectiveness of the different approaches and; 
  find out what works best where. 
Two hundred and forty seven burglary reduction projects have been funded, covering over
2.1million households that suffered around 110,000 burglaries a year. Three distraction
burglary projects have also been funded.
The Evaluation
Three consortia of universities have intensively evaluated the first round of 63 RBI projects.
A further five projects from subsequent rounds of the RBI (rounds two and three) are also
being evaluated.
This report is part of a series of studies examining burglary reduction practice being
published during 2003. Also to be published are a summary and full report on the overall
impact and cost-effectiveness of Round 1 of the RBI. Other themes to be covered in this
series are: 
  the delivery of burglary reduction projects;
  police detection strategies;
  publicity and awareness of burglary reduction schemes; and 
  the use of alley-gates as a means to reduce burglary. 
iPublished reports
Early lessons from the RBI have already been published in the following reports, which are
available from www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pubsintro1.html
Tilley N, Pease K, Hough M and Brown R (1999) ‘Burglary Prevention: Early Lessons from
the Crime Reduction Programme’ Crime Reduction Research Series Paper 1, London: Home
Office
Curtin L, Tilley N, Owen M and Pease K (2001) ‘ Developing Crime Reduction Plans: Some
Examples from the Reducing Burglary Initiative’ Crime Reduction Research Series Paper 7,
London: Home Office
Hedderman C and Williams C (2001) ‘ Making Partnership Work: Emerging Findings from
the Reducing Burglary Initiative’ Briefing Note 1/01, London: Home Office
Johnson S and Loxley C (2001) ‘ Installing Alley-gates: Practical Lessons from Burglary
Prevention Projects’ Briefing Note 2/01, London: Home Office
iiiii
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vviMain findings
This report describes the main findings of a detailed evaluation of a burglary reduction
project located in Liverpool in the North of England. The scheme consisted of four
interventions: alley-gating, target hardening of property, property marking and an offender
rehabilitation intervention. New analytical techniques, discussed in detail in this report,
were developed in order to answer the key evaluation questions. The results may be
summarised as follows:
  Identifying the precise geographical areas in which crime prevention
interventions are implemented is important in assessing the effectiveness of
schemes. For the Liverpool scheme, the official boundary of the target area
was defined as two complete police beats, although the interventions were
focused almost exclusively within three sub-areas. Analyses revealed that
burglary reduction was dramatic in the sub-areas of intense implementation
within the official boundary of the scheme.
  Statistical analysis, comparing the police beats that made up the scheme area
to other police beats in Merseyside, showed that the reduction in burglary was
statistically significant.
  Repeat burglary, as well as single incidents of burglary, significantly reduced
in the scheme area.
  Analyses of crime rates in the areas that surrounded the scheme suggested that
there was some evidence of geographical displacement. However, in a buffer
zone that was within very close vicinity of the scheme, a diffusion of benefit
(i.e. a reduction in burglary) was also evident.
  There was some evidence that following the implementation of the scheme offenders may
have switched to committing other types of crime within the scheme area. In particular,
theft from car significantly increased in the area. There was no significant switch to theft
from a person, taking a vehicle without thse owners consent or theft of car.
viiviii viii
  In the sub-areas where crime prevention activity was concentrated, there was
evidence of a diffusion of benefit to untreated households. In other words,
burglary reduced in both those properties that had been treated and those that
had not.
  In order to get the most accurate assessment of the effectiveness of crime
prevention strategies aimed at individual properties, it is necessary to examine
the pattern of victimisation of these properties over time. Doing this for the
Liverpool scheme revealed that 13 burglaries were prevented in a one-year
period across 363 properties that had been target hardened. Moreover, the
risk to these properties was almost halved following target-hardening. This
exercise was done for each intervention type.
  Assessment should be made of the degree to which other initiatives in a
scheme area are likely to cause burglary reduction. In the Liverpool scheme, it
was concluded that such initiatives were unlikely to have contributed to the
reduction found.
The implications of these results for crime prevention are discussed in the report. ix ix
Executive summary 
This report is a result of evaluation research undertaken in the north of England, that
was commissioned by the Home Office to assess the impact of burglary projects funded
under the first round of the Reducing Burglary Initiative (RBI). This paper, which focuses
on one burglary scheme undertaken in Liverpool, demonstrates the power of using
disaggregate, or individual level, burglary data in assessing the impacts and outcomes
of such schemes, and illustrates that very different conclusions may be drawn when such
analyses are not conducted.
The first three procedures described examine methods of measuring the impact of crime
reduction schemes on levels of burglary (and other crimes) within the operational
boundaries of the initiative. These concern:
Measuring changes in the burglary rate
This compares changes in the burglary rate within the boundary of the scheme with a series
of comparison areas. The comparison areas included one police beat, matched on social
and economic characteristics with the scheme’s operational area, the wider police Basic
Command Unit (BCU) and the wider Police Force Area (PFA). Importantly, changes in the
burglary rate for the entire scheme area (which is the only analysis possible with aggregate
level data) are compared with changes in smaller sub-areas of the scheme into which
treatment was concentrated. The analysis revealed that the scheme had a substantial impact
on the burglary rate for the sub-areas in which crime reduction activity was almost
exclusively concentrated, but that the change in the burglary rate was relatively modest for
the entire scheme area. This finding demonstrates that sub-scheme analysis is essential in
measuring the real impact of measures taken, particularly when initiatives are
geographically concentrated.
Statistical procedures for assessing impact
In order to assign statistical significance to changes in the burglary rate in the scheme area,
a method was developed that compared these changes with those experienced in other
police beats throughout the county of Merseyside. Specifically, z-tests were undertaken tosee whether the reduction in burglary in the scheme area was significantly different from
that seen in police beats in general. Results demonstrated that changes in the burglary rate
for the scheme area, and in particular for the sub-areas, were statistically significant. 
Examining the distribution of repeat victimisation
This section highlights the importance of examining the concentration as well as the
incidence and/or prevalence of burglary. There was evidence that levels of repeat burglary,
as well as burglary per se, had decreased disproportionately in the scheme area when
compared with the comparison areas. Interestingly, decreases in the repeat rate were
detected in areas that had not experienced a decrease in burglary per se. This illustrates
that to fully understand the impact of crime reduction activity, it is necessary to consider
repeat victimisation in addition to simple burglary rates. 
The paper proceeds to consider the possibility of crime displacement; that is, whether the
measures taken as part of the burglary reduction scheme caused local burglary offenders to
change their offending behaviour by targeting other properties, other areas or other types of
crime. Therefore, three different types of displacement are considered here:
Geographical displacement
This describes a method for assessing the extent to which offenders move to other areas to
commit burglary as a result of the action being taken. Pre and post-intervention burglary
rates were examined in the target area, a buffer zone that surrounded the scheme, and the
wider police force area. The theoretical rationale for the analysis was three-fold: 
1. For displacement to occur there should be a reduction in the burglary rate for the
target area indicating that offenders were avoiding this area (to some extent),
thereby increasing the possibility that they would target alternative areas. 
2. That coincident with this change the crime rate in the buffer zone should increase. 
3. Finally, that the changes observed in both the target and buffer zone areas should
exceed those observed in the wider police force area, thereby demonstrating that
they did not simply reflect a more general trend. 
x xDetailed analysis considered change in the crime rates for a series of five smaller
displacement buffer zones contained within the general buffer area. The method of
calculation (which calculates a ‘weighted displacement quotient’ WDQ) therefore compares
changes in the burglary rates for these five different (but nested) areas over time. Briefly, a
single statistic is produced which describes the extent to which displacement (or, of course,
diffusion of benefit) is likely to have occurred. Positive WDQ values indicate diffusion of
benefit to the buffer zone and negative WDQ values indicate geographical displacement of
crime. Considering the WDQ values, a figure of +1 indicates a diffusion of benefit where
the burglary reduction in the buffer zone is equal to that in the project area. A figure of –1
indicates a displacement where the burglary reduction is entirely offset by increases in the
buffer zone. A WDQ of zero represents a scenario where there was apparently no change
in the buffer zone, or where this change could not be attributed to changes in the SDP. 
Results of the analysis showed some evidence of geographical displacement as a result of
the Liverpool scheme. Interestingly, there was evidence of a diffusion of benefit in the
immediate vicinity of the scheme. In contrast, there was substantial evidence of
displacement at a distance of approximately 400 metres or more from the operational
boundary of the scheme. In addition, the pattern of results suggested that there was
evidence of a distance-decay effect, with the extent of geographic displacement dissipating
across greater distances.
Crime type switch
This assesses the extent to which the action taken causes offenders operating within the
scheme area to switch to perpetrating offences of other types of crime. The analysis was
limited to other types of property crime, namely theft from a person, taking of a vehicle
without the owner's consent, theft of car and theft from car. It was found that very different
trends were observed in these crime types. Crucially, although theft of car did not appear to
be affected in the area, theft from car increased very significantly when compared with
changes observed in the comparison areas. Further analysis revealed that this pattern of
results was statistically significant. It is hypothesised that the reason for this switch is that the
skills required for committing theft from car and burglary are very similar and they are both
likely to yield goods that can be sold on for financial gain. 
xi xiTarget switch
A third type of displacement that may result from crime reduction activity is that of target
switch. It is possible that where certain houses have been treated on a street (e.g. by target
hardening measures), offenders will simply target other properties that have not received
treatment. This issue was investigated by identifying all treated and untreated properties in
the sub-areas of the scheme in which crime reduction activity was concentrated. Changes in
burglary rates were calculated for both groups of properties. Interestingly, relative to the
drop in burglary in the treated properties, burglary rates in the non-treated properties fell
almost as much. This effect was not observed in any of the comparison areas, nor, indeed,
for the rest of the scheme areas (those outside the three sub-areas). This shows a very local
diffusion of benefit effect, whereby houses situated near to treated properties also appear to
have been avoided by offenders after the measures were installed.
The procedures discussed above outline methods of assessing impacts of burglary schemes
as a whole. However, it is important to remember that it is very unusual for schemes to
concentrate solely on one intervention. Far more commonly, schemes involve undertaking a
number of different interventions to combat a burglary problem. In the case of Liverpool, for
example, four different interventions were involved: target-hardening, property marking
(Smartwater), alley-gating and an offender behaviour scheme. In order to start to understand
what it is that makes a scheme successful, it is important to try to isolate the impact of the
individual interventions undertaken. Therefore methods were developed which:
  Can be used to assess the impact of individual interventions
This technique uses information on the actual individual properties that were
treated as part of an intervention. For illustrative purposes, this section focuses
on target-hardening. It was found that by examining levels of burglary in these
properties by simply taking the overall start date of the scheme to define before
and after periods, the target hardening intervention appeared to be very
ineffective. However, further analyses that used information concerned with the
actual date of target hardening for each property revealed a very different
picture. The method described also corrects for differences in opportunity due
to the fact that the before and after target-hardening periods examined will
vary depending on the exact date of target hardening. These ‘opportunity-
dependent rates’ are then used to calculate an outcome in terms of the number
of burglaries prevented by the intervention, by comparing the after target
hardening rate to an expected rate produced using the before period. The
xii xiimethod also takes into account general changes in the burglary rate at the
county level over time. Results indicated that the target hardening intervention,
which involved 363 properties, prevented 13 burglaries in a one-year period.
  Apply this method to each intervention type
This opportunity-dependent rate method was used to calculate outcomes for
each of the three geographically targeted interventions in the Liverpool scheme
area (that is, target hardening, alleygating and property marking). One
complication is that individual properties could receive up to three of these
treatments. In other words, whilst some properties only received target
hardening, others could have received target hardening and property marking,
target hardening and alleygating, or, indeed, all three measures. Outcomes
were therefore calculated for each of the possible combinations of
interventions. Results indicated that target hardening, either on its own or in
combination with other interventions, appeared to be particularly effective.
A final section addresses the issue of other crime reduction efforts, which could potentially
have a confounding effect on the outcome analysis described in the report. Other crime
reduction and regeneration activities were operating in the area within the timescale of the
Liverpool SDP. However, these other schemes were implemented across wide areas of the
city of Liverpool. For this reason, it can be assumed that the BCU, the comparison area and
the buffer zone of the SDP would all have been affected by these other initiatives. This
means that to a certain degree the influence of other initiatives was controlled for. The report
concludes that ‘other interventions’ were unlikely to have contributed to the change
observed in the scheme area.
xiii xiiixiv1. Introduction
As far as we are aware, the majority of published crime reduction evaluations have, in the
past, utilised recorded crime (and other) data that is aggregated to particular geographical
area units such as police beats or local authority wards. Whilst the use of such data enables
evaluators to determine the effects of a particular scheme at the general area level, it clearly
precludes the computation of more sophisticated analyses. Such analyses should, critically,
allow specific a priori (and, of course, post hoc) hypotheses to be tested that may potentially
explain why a particular scheme was or was not successful, or whether it was successful in
some respects but not others. For instance, for a target-hardening scheme, whilst the crime
rate for the general area in which the scheme operates may be unaffected, target-hardened
households may experience significantly lower levels of victimisation than would have been
expected had the scheme not existed. Alternatively, although the burglary crime rate may
remain unchanged, levels of repeat victimisation may be dramatically reduced. In addition,
and importantly, the use of aggregate level data also limits the investigation of whether there
were any unexpected side effects, or spin-offs of the scheme, such as the geographical
displacement of crime. To do this type of analysis, one would require disaggregate level
data, which provides data concerning individual incidents of crime and includes information
on the address, geographical location (e.g. an easting and northing grid reference) and
date of the offence (for a further discussion of this issue, see Johnson et al, 2001). Studies
that have used disaggregate level crime data (e.g. Anderson et al, 1995; Bennett and
Durie, 1999), whilst being insightful have been limited to analyses of rates of victimisation
and repeat victimisation at the area level only.
In 1999 the Home Office launched the RBI, a multi million pound initiative aimed
specifically at reducing domestic burglary. A total of 63 projects were commissioned in the
first round which varied considerably in terms of the interventions they employed, although
most had a strong situational crime reduction focus. Of these, 21 were commissioned in the
north, Midlands and south of England respectively (for more details, see Tilley et al, 1999).
In addition to funding the projects themselves, the Home Office commissioned three
evaluation consortia to evaluate the schemes operating in the different regions. The
consortium commissioned to evaluate the schemes operating in the North of England
comprises research groups based at three different universities, these being the
Environmental Criminology Research Unit (ECRU) at the University of Liverpool, the Applied
Criminology Group (ACG) at the University of Huddersfield, and the Centre of Criminology
and Criminal Justice at the University of Hull. 
1Part of the evaluation design adopted by the Northern consortium was to conduct in-depth
case studies for each of the schemes using disaggregate level data. However, for numerous
reasons, one of the most influential being police data protection procedures, the Northern
consortium was unable to obtain such data for three of the five police force areas that cover
the northern region. In addition, data for one of the police forces was obtained at a very
late stage in the evaluation. Taken together, these problems limited the number of case
studies that could be conducted. However, links between the evaluators and the Merseyside
Police Force led to the consortium having access to this information for Merseyside from the
beginning of the evaluation. Therefore, the Liverpool Strategic Development Project (SDP)
has been selected as a case study to demonstrate the sophistication of the analysis that is
possible where good information is available and to illustrate some of the new techniques
developed for the evaluation.
The current report will first discuss the Liverpool scheme and the interventions employed, and
then present analyses concerned with the outcome of the scheme. Particular emphasis will
be placed upon the new techniques developed to measure the statistical significance of any
changes in the crime rate for the target area, the effectiveness of target-hardening and the
extent to which geographical, crime-type and target-switch displacement were evident.
Other sections will consider changes in the rate of repeat victimisation, and a novel
approach to mapping the change in crime rates.
The Liverpool case study 
The Liverpool SDP is situated in the county of Merseyside. Figure 1.1 is a detailed map of
the SDP target area, which shows the operational boundary of the scheme superimposed on
an orthophotograph of the area. It is evident that the target area is composed of some open
land and a number of streets of terraced housing. The Liverpool SDP scheme employed four
different interventions, as follows. 
The target-hardening scheme involved the surveying of, and where appropriate, the
installation of physical security measures which included new mortice locks, door chains
and window locks. Specifically, residents were offered target-hardening if they fitted the
criteria adopted for the scheme, i.e. that they had already been victims of crime or that they
fitted the typical profile of a vulnerable resident, which included elderly residents, students
and those on a low income. Eligible residents were identified in one of two ways. First,
residents who were victims of burglary were contacted and subsequently visited by the
target-hardening surveyor (a specific targeting approach). Second, residents were also
2visited as part of a more general strategy, whereby the surveyor visited all households
contained within the target area. This two-level approach ensured that burglary victims were
assisted as close to the incidents’ occurrence as possible.
Figure 1.1: Liverpool Strategic Development Project Area (sub-areas shaded in white)
The Smartwater intervention involved the marking of residents’ personal property to increase
the likelihood of stolen property being recovered, and to discourage offenders from burgling
protected properties. Smartwater is essentially a chemical solution, undetectable to the
human eye unless examined under ultra-violet light, that is applied to items of personal
property. The solution itself represents a chemical marker, for which the chemical sequence
has an almost limitless number of combinations. With the right equipment it is possible to
identify a particular Smartwater code or sequence. The approach adopted by the Liverpool
team was to property mark personal property for households located on different streets
using different versions of the solution, meaning that any recovered property could be
identified as belonging to an individual living on a specific street. Additional information
including a description of each item of property was recorded on a computer database,
meaning that for any item of recovered (marked) property the actual owner should be
identifiable. To ensure that any recovered items of personal property could be identified,
3ultra-violet lights were installed in the police stations that service the target area and police
officers received training regarding the intervention. For each household, residents had up
to ten items of personal property marked using smartwater. In addition, as a deterrent to
offenders, all households that had been property marked in this way were given a sticker to
put in their window, to indicate that they were part of the scheme. All residents who lived in
the specific target area were offered this intervention.
The third intervention was an alley-gating scheme that involved the installation of lockable
hard-wearing gates to both ends of the alleyways at the rear of the properties, with the aim
of restricting access to potential offenders. Due to legal requirements, prior to the installation
of the gates it was necessary to obtain approval from the residents affected by the scheme.
1
Thus, teams of surveyors, funded through levered-in resources, visited properties to seek
residents approval and to explain the scheme to them. As experienced by other schemes
(see Johnson and Loxley, 2001), the legal process of applying for closure orders for each of
the alleyways impeded the progress of this scheme. Thus, although all of the surveys were
completed by May 2000, only ten of the 69 gates were installed before 1 April 2001.
Thus, only these ten gates will be considered in the research described below.
The final scheme was an offender-based scheme named the ‘Wavertree Dordrecht project’.
This involved the intensive supervision of offenders with the aim of changing their attitudes
towards offending and their offending behaviour. This scheme, which is still ongoing, is
supported both by Merseyside police and the probation service, who each provided one
member of staff to work on the project on a day to day basis. Home Office funding was
used to match fund (50 per cent) the salary for the probation officer for a period of one
year. The scheme is aimed at offenders either on licence, or at the pre-trial stage of
sentencing who had committed burglaries within the target area. Offenders who met the
4
1 Where a back alley provides no right of way to any person other than the immediate residents - i.e. a private
right of way, many local authorities run alley-gating schemes which allow such alleys to be closed off with the
consent of all the residents. The Guidance for those involved in alley-gating is on the Home Office crime
reduction website at www.crimereduction.gov.uk/gating.htm. Further guidance can be found in the Home office
Briefing Note 2/01 "Installing Alley-gates: Practical Lessons from Burglary Prevention Projects" which may be
viewed on the Home Office website at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/prgbriefpubs1.html 
Where a back alley carries a public right of passage, a legal closure/diversion is necessary. The new provisions
in Sections 118B and 119B Highways Act 1980 allow an authority to apply to have an area that is a crime 'hot
spot' designated, allowing rights of way within that area to be closed or diverted for crime reduction purposes.
Local highway authorities will usually take the lead, working with crime and disorder reduction partnerships,
police authorities, local residents and user groups to formulate a submission to the Secretary of State seeking the
inclusion of an area, or areas, in a designation order. In county areas, the district authority or the local crime
and disorder reduction partnership may be able to make a submission if the county council is unwilling to do so.
The authority will need to show (a) that the area has a right of way that can be shown to facilitate high levels of
persistent crime and (b) that previous attempts to reduce crime in the area have been tried and found to be
ineffective Guidance is available online at: www.defra.gov.uk/wildlife-countryside/cl/publicrow.htmcriteria for the scheme were largely identified by colleagues in the probation service who
had been informed of the scheme. Once identified, offenders were approached by the staff
and invited to participate. During the period 1 January 2000–31 March 2001 a total of six
offenders had been recruited and had participated in the scheme.
These interventions do not all operate in the entire target area, and, in particular, the target-
hardening, property marking and alley-gating initiatives were almost exclusively
concentrated within the three sub-areas shaded white in Figure 1.1. Since sub-areas were
used for three of the four interventions there is the possibility that the initiatives could have
caused some displacement of burglary within the target area. Moreover, it is also possible
that any reductions in burglary rates would only have been observed in these areas.
The offender scheme is distinct from the other three interventions since it is not
geographically targeted in sub-areas of the target area. Furthermore, its approach to
burglary reduction is rather more long-term, as it takes an offender –based, rather than a
situational prevention-based, perspective. For these reasons, although the offender
intervention is accounted for in analyses that consider the overall effect of the scheme, its
individual impact on burglary in the scheme area is not assessed in the analysis that follows.
Contextual information
More specific contextual data for the SDP area is available from the 1991 Population
Census, and the left hand column of Table 1.1 summaries some of the socio-demographic
characteristics of the SDP. The Table shows that the area is made up of 3317 households, of
which the majority of houses are terraced properties, making up 79.4 per cent of the total
households in the area. There is also a substantial percentage of flats and bedsits in the
area (14.5 per cent). Interestingly, the SDP area is not as deprived as some of the other
SDPs in the Northern Consortium area; there is a high percentage of households that are
owner occupied (70.4 per cent) and a lower than average number of households without a
car (44.9 per cent compared to a consortium average of 55 per cent).
2
Part of the evaluation methodology adopted involves defining and studying crime trends in a
series of comparison areas for each of the 21 projects. These areas include the remainder of
the police force area (PFA–SDP), the remainder of the police basic command unit (BCU–SDP)
in which the SDP is located and a further area with a socio-demographic profile as similar to
5
2 It should be noted that because all these figures are taken from the 1991 census, it is likely that some of this
information is out-of-date. However, since the SDP area is mainly composed of well-established older housing,
the housing stock of the area is unlikely to have changed dramatically over the last ten years. Although the SDP
area did not conform to census geography, a procedure that makes a correction for this boundary problem was
used that has been described in full elsewhere (Hirschfield and Bowers, 1997).the SDP as possible. This last area, which will subsequently be referred to as the ‘comparison
area’, was selected through an iterative search process using a geographical information
system (GIS). The criteria for selecting the comparison area were as follows: 
  that the area conformed to police beat geography; 
  that it was in the same local authority district as the target area; 
  that it was as similar as possible to the target area in terms of its socio-
economic makeup; 
  that it was not contiguous with the SDP (to ensure that changes in this area
could not simply be attributed to geographical displacement from the SDP). 
The right hand column of Table 1.1 shows that the SDP and the comparison area are similar in
terms of census variables. As is the case with the SDP area itself, the comparison area is primarily
composed of terraced houses and has a high percentage of households that are owner-occupied.
In addition, it has very similar levels of households without a car to the target area.
This section has provided contextual information on the SDP and comparison areas. The rest of
this paper will examine changes in the burglary rate and distribution of crime since the SDP has
been operational. The first section looks at these changes and at the issue of repeat victimisation,
whilst sections 2 to 4 consider three different types of displacement. These are geographic
displacement, which is said to have occurred when offenders commit crimes that they would have
committed in the target area in a buffer zone that surrounds the target area; crime-switch,
whereby offenders commit other types of (replacement) crime(s) instead of burglary; and target-
switch, where offenders still commit crimes within the target area(s) but select individual properties
that have not been subject to the crime reduction strategy. Section 5 focuses on the individual
target hardening of properties in the area and its effect on burglary rates. Section 6 expands on
this by assessing the impact of other interventions implemented by the scheme. Finally section 7
considers the potential effect of other crime reduction initiatives in the SDP area on changes in the
level of burglary within the scheme area.
6Table 1.1 Socio-demographic profile of the scheme and comparison areas
Scheme area Comparison area
Households 3,317 2,658
Residents 7,889 6,670
Detached houses (%) 0.5 4.0
Semis (%) 3.3 15.4
Terraced (%) 79.4 66.4
Flats and bedsits (%) 14.5 13.4
Households owner occupied (%) 70.4 74.0
Council-rented (%) 2.9 3.7
Furnished rented (%) 8.2 5.3
Unfurnished rented (%) 10.5 7.9
Other (%) 8.0 9.0
Persons economically inactive (%) 38.7 38.1
Households without a car (%) 44.9 45.7
Persons unemployed (%) 14.7 13.9
Recent migrants (%) 10.7 13.5
Non-white residents (%) 10.8 5.5
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2. Changes in the burglary rate
Disaggregate level data concerned with burglary, covering the period 1 April 1997 to 31
March 2001, was obtained for the county of Merseyside. This data, extracted from
Merseyside Police Force’s Integrated Criminal Justice System (ICJS) includes the following
fields of data: a unique crime reference number; crime code; the address where the
burglary took place; an easting and northing grid reference accurate to within one-metre;
and the date and time of the offence.
These data were used to provide historic data that covered the two-year period that
preceded the start of the project (April 1999), and data that covered the two-year period 1
April 1999 to 31 March 2001 during which the SDP was active. This data was then
cleaned using software generated by the researchers (Johnson et al, 1997) which amongst
other things, identifies and discards duplicate records, those without grid references, those
without dates, and those without sufficient information to uniquely identify the address of the
offence (e.g. 21 The Road – an address without indication of the area or postcode). The
clean data (the incident counts for which are shown in Appendix 2) was used to compute
burglary rates for the SDP, the BCU, the Police Force Area (PFA) and other areas of interest. 
A further issue that warrants discussion is the fact that whilst the target area is defined as
two police beats, as noted above three of the four interventions (target hardening,
smartwater and alleygating) were almost exclusively confined to three sub-areas within the
SDP. For this reason, maps of the three sub areas were obtained, and the boundaries were
digitised and imported into a GIS. This allowed us to calculate crime rates for the sub-area
within the SDP where the three types of measure were concentrated and the remainder of
the SDP that had received very little attention in terms of physical security upgrades. Figure
2.1 shows the burglary rates for six different areas for the period before and after inception
of the Liverpool SDP (that is 1 April 1997–31 March 1999 and 1 April 1999–31 March
2001 respectively). These areas are the SDP as defined by its entire operational boundary,
the sub-area of the SDP in which the situational crime reduction measures were focused, the
remainder of the SDP (where there was little or no activity), the comparison area, the BCU in
which the SDP was located, and the PFA. Figure 2.1: Burglary rates using cleaned data before and after the SDP began 
A number of clear patterns are evident in Figure 2.1. Firstly, the burglary rate in the PFA
showed only a slight reduction, the crime rate in the BCU remained stable, and the rate in the
comparison area actually increased somewhat. In contrast, the burglary rate in the entire SDP
saw a reduction over time. However, consideration of the reductions observed for the
targeted and non-targeted sub-areas of the SDP reveals that there was a differential effect in
these two areas, such that whilst there was a considerable reduction in the area(s) subject to
situational crime reduction, there was a much more limited effect in the non-targeted areas.
For instance, the SDP sub-area had an initial rate that was 3.6 times that of the PFA, but later
had a rate that was just 2.5 times the PFA rate. In contrast, relative to the PFA rate, the rates
for the non-targeted areas of the SDP, the BCU and the comparison area increased. This
clearly suggests that the SDP had an effect on the burglary rate, and also illustrates the fact
that a much more accurate picture of what has occurred can be obtained using disaggregate
data which enables analysis at the sub-scheme area. Finally, since there was evident
selectivity in terms of the change in the burglary rates across the different areas, some of
which had similar initial burglary rates to the target area, it is very unlikely that the change
observed in the target area was simply due to regression to the mean or random factors.
Statistical significance of change in the burglary rate
Whilst the above results revealed that there was a change in the burglary rate for the SDP,
they do not show whether this change was statistically significant or simply due to random
fluctuation. One way of testing this is by comparing the reduction in burglary in the target
area with the change observed in a series of comparison areas. Since the SDP was
composed of two police beats it was decided that police beats would be the best unit of
analysis. Thus, the burglary rate before and after the inception of the Liverpool scheme was
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Aftercalculated for each of the police beats in the Merseyside area. To minimise the effects of
outlying data, the analyses were only conducted for beats of a fairly equal size to the SDP
beats, hence a subset of the beats, those with 1000 or more residential properties, were
selected for the analysis. This produced a sample of 289 beats. A simple measure of
change in the burglary rates in these beats was then produced, as follows:
Figure 2.2 shows the distribution for these 'difference' scores for the 289 beats. It is clear
that the data were fairly normally distributed, having a mean of -3.2 and a standard
deviation of 12.72. Thus, on average there was a slight decrease in the crime rate over
time. To see if the change in the burglary rate in the SDP was significant relative to the
average change observed, z-scores, which measure how many standard deviations above
or below the sample mean an observation is, were calculated for each beat. The Liverpool
SDP was composed of two beats (beat codes C434 and C554) and these had z-scores of
+0.37 and -1.53 respectively. The latter z-score was the 20th largest (reduction) value of the
sample of 289 beats and had a p value of 0.12 (two-tailed), indicating that the decrease in
the burglary rate was non-significant. Importantly, it should be noted that this analysis does
not control for differences in the beats in terms of social and economic characteristics, and
does not take into account the fact that many of the beats will have active crime reduction
schemes operating within them which would presumably lead to a reduction in the crime
rate. Therefore, the analysis is likely to be conservative in nature and is likely to
underestimate (rather than overestimate) the effect of the scheme. In addition, a z-score was
calculated for the targeted sub-area of the SDP. This had a value of -3.40 which is
statistically significant at the 1 per cent level (two-tailed), indicating that there was a
significant change in this area that exceeded the average change. 
In short, relative to similar sized beats within the Merseyside region, one of the beats that
made up the SDP, and the targeted area within the SDP, showed a statistically significant
reduction over time. 
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Figure 2.2: Distribution of changes in the burglary rate for police beats
Targeted vs non-targeted areas of SDP
A further analysis considered the burglary rates in the targeted and non-targeted areas of
the SDP. The purpose of this analysis was to determine whether the crime rates for these two
areas followed the same trend, with the hypothesis under evaluation being that if the
intervention had an effect, then whilst the two areas should follow a similar pattern before
the start of the scheme, they should follow different patterns after the start of the scheme.
Figure 2.1 shows that prior to the start of the scheme the rates were fairly similar, but that in
the two year period that followed the start of the scheme the rate in the targeted but not the
non-targeted area fell substantially. Figure 2.3 shows how the crime rates for these two
areas varied over time for both the pre and post-implementation periods. It is evident that
the crime rates followed a similar pattern before the start of the scheme, but they followed
different trends after the inception of the scheme. To examine the way in which the crime
rates co-varied over time, non-parametric Spearman’s rho correlations were computed for
the two time periods, using the crime rate for each of the eight quarterly time points as
observations. The correlation coefficient for the before period was highly significant
(rs(8)=.90, p<.01, two-tailed) indicating that the two areas followed the same trend over
time. In contrast, the correlation for the after period was non-significant (rs(8)=-.14, p=.75,
two-tailed) demonstrating that the conditions appeared to differ in these two areas for this
time period, both in terms of the level of crime committed and the quarterly change in the
crime rate.
12R
a
t
e
 
p
e
r
 
1
0
0
0
 
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
s
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
targeted rate non-targeted rate PFA-BCU rate*4
D
AG
TH & SW
AS
D – offender supervision scheme AG – installation of alleygates (10 gates)
TH & SW – target hardening and smartwater installation AS – alleygating surveys
Apr-June97
July-Sept97
Oct-Dec97
Jan-Mar98
Apr-June98
July-Sept98
Oct-Dec98
Jan-Mar98
Apr-June99
July-Sept99
Oct-Dec99
Jan-Mar00
Apr-June00
July-Sept00
Oct-Dec00
Jan-Mar01
Figure 2.3: Quarterly crime rates in targeted and non-targeted areas 
Figure 2.3 also gives an indication of the time periods during which the four interventions
operated or, in the case of the target hardening and smartwater initiatives, when activity
was most intensive, and shows the crime rate for the PFA (minus the BCU) which is scaled by
a factor of four to ease interpretation. The figure shows a number of potential trends that
may be summarised as follows. First, the change over time for the police force area and the
non-targeted areas were relatively consistent for both the pre- and post-implementation time
periods. For this reason, the subsequent discussion will focus on comparisons between the
targeted and non-targeted areas only. Second, it is apparent that the crime rate in the
targeted area fell in the quarter in which the alleygating surveys commenced (Oct–Dec
1999), whilst the crime rate in the non-targeted area actually rose quite considerably. Third,
the crime rate also fell steeply in the quarter in which the target hardening and smartwater
initiatives were most intensive (July–Sept 2000) and during which ten alleygates were
installed. During this period, the same was true for the non-targeted area. However, it is
evident that the rate of decline in the targeted area was much greater. Finally, with the
exception of the first and last quarters, following the onset crime reduction activity, the crime
rate in the targeted area was lower in the targeted versus the non-targeted area. This is in
contrast to the trend observed for the historic period that predated the inception of the
scheme, during which the crime rate in the targeted area was, in general, the same as, or
slightly higher than that in the non-targeted area. 
In the final quarter the burglary rate for the targeted area exceeded that for the non-targeted
area. During this quarter the main implementation of crime reduction measures had finished.
This is interesting as it may suggest that the effect of the scheme was not sustainable or it
13could be due to lack of evidence of further physical implementation in the area leading to
offenders feeling it was safe to offend in the area once more. However, further data would
be required to confirm this. Taken together, the results show that there was a reduction in the
burglary rate following the start of the scheme and that the reduction observed for the
targeted sub-areas appeared to coincide with a crude indicator of the timing of crime
reduction activity.
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3. Repeat  victimisation 
Methodology
To examine repeat victimisation the burglary data discussed above, and a further 12 months
of historic data that covered the period 1 April 1996–31 March 1997, was analysed using
software developed by the researchers (Johnson et al, 1996). This software was written in
FORTRAN and works in the following way. The program developed reads in all the records
concerned with domestic burglary from a recorded crime file. A dynamic array,
3 in which
each element pertains to a unique address, is updated as the records are read in. When a
new record is read in, the array is searched to see if a crime has already occurred at that
address within the previous 12 months. If it has then the corresponding record is updated to
indicate that a repeat occurred.
4 However, if this is the first incident at the address, as
reflected by the absence of the address in the array, then the new record is simply added to
the array. Alternatively, if the address supplied has too few characters to identify a unique
address, or there is no grid reference, or the record is identified as a duplicate record by
the program, the record is discarded. The resulting array includes the following information:
the addresses of all households which have been burgled, the number of incidents that have
occurred at each address, and the dates on which each incident occurred.
Levels of repeat victimisation 
Figure 3.1 shows the levels of repeat burglary in each of the areas for the before and after
time periods. It is apparent that, in general, levels of repeat victimisation actually increased
over time (1 per cent in the PFA and 4 per cent in the BCU). However, in the SDP, the level
of repeat victimisation actually fell by around 29 per cent. Moreover, for the SDP sub-area
the level fell by around 40 per cent, meaning that for this area the level of re-victimisation
fell from a figure which was initially higher than that for the PFA, to a level that was
considerably lower than that for the PFA. Interestingly, whilst the crime rate did not show
much of a reduction in the non-targeted areas of the SDP, the level of repeat victimisation
did (25 per cent reduction). This finding clearly illustrates that it is not possible to fully
3 An array is a form of data file that is stored in a computer’s memory, it is referred to here as a dynamic array to
reflect the fact that the array increases in size as each new record is processed.
4 A complex address-matching algorithm was developed so that the program could determine whether two
addresses were the same; this algorithm compensates, to some extent, for spelling mistakes and the inconsistency
with which addresses are stored on most police databases (For a discussion of the technique see Johnson et al.,
1997; and for program code used, Johnson et al., 1996)0
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understand the effects of crime reduction initiatives without considering repeat victimisation
as well as changes in the crime rate. In this case, for the non-targeted parts of the SDP,
whilst the general burglary rate remained stable, the risk to previously victimized households
appeared to be reduced. Thus, it is apparent that the reduction in the risk of repeat
victimisation was accompanied by a slight increase in the risk to previously non-victimised
properties.
5
However, it is also notable that the change in repeat victimisation was considerably lower
than that observed within the targeted area. This indicates that the change in the
victimisation pattern for the SDP sub-area was almost certainly attributable to the SDP
interventions and that the change in the pattern of repeat victimisation in the non-targeted
areas of the SDP was likely to be an expression of a diffusion of benefit. Hence, the effect of
the SDP was not only to reduce crime in the SDP but also to reduce levels of revictimisation,
which is one of the main aims of target hardening.
One possible reason for this diffusion of benefit is that offenders may have been aware that
part of the selection criteria adopted by the target hardening initiative is that previously
victimised properties are given priority. Furthermore, whilst they may know that a scheme is
operational within a general area, it is unlikely that they will be aware of the precise
boundary of the initiative. Thus, from the offender’s perspective, revictimising properties in
the general area may not be as attractive an opportunity as it previously was.
Figure 3.1: Proportion of burglaries that were incidents of repeat victimisation 
16
5 Follow up analyses confirmed that the number of non-repeat incidents of crime increased in the non-targeted part
of the SDP following the inception of the scheme, but reduced in the targeted area.17
4. Displacement
The sections that follow will consider three different types of displacement in some detail. To
anticipate the findings, as with the results presented thus far, it will become apparent that
the use of disaggregate data is essential for the analysis of crime displacement.
Geographical displacement 
Geographical boundary data
The actual SDP target area for the Liverpool scheme comprised two complete police beats (C434
and C554). As shown in Figure 1.1, the boundary for the two beats was digitised and imported
into the GIS. Next, to examine geographical displacement, we defined a general buffer zone
that surrounded the SDP. To allow a more detailed analysis to be conducted, we defined five
(rather than one) concentric buffer rings that had the same morphology as the boundary of the
scheme area. The first buffer was produced so that it started at the SDP boundary and finished
400 metres from the boundary at all points. This produces a band shape that mimics the SDP
boundary all the way around. A further buffer was then created that began at the boundary of
the first buffer and ended a further 400 metres from this boundary, so that the outside boundary
was 800 metres from the SDP boundary. Further buffers were created in the same way, until there
were five rings surrounding the SDP area. Using this system of concentric buffers, it was possible
to look at the change in the distribution of burglaries 0–400 ms, 400–800 ms……1600–2000
ms away from the SDP area, to check for possible geographic displacement.
Calculating geographical displacement for each buffer
To measure the extent to which displacement or diffusion of benefit occurred, we used a new
technique, the Weighted Displacement Quotient (WDQ: Bowers & Johnson, 2001), developed
for the evaluation. The WDQ technique is summarized in this section, and the equation
presented in Appendix 1. For an extended account along with a discussion of the research
literature the interested reader is referred to Bowers and Johnson (in press). Essentially, the
WDQ examines the change in the distribution of crime in the buffer zone(s) and compares this
with the previous distribution of crime and with any changes in the PFA, and then relates these
patterns to any changes observed in the target area. Critically, changes are measured relative
to the temporal distribution of crime in the PFA, and geographical displacement is only
assumed to have occurred if a reduction occurs in the target area whilst there is an increase in
the buffer zone. In contrast, diffusion of benefit is presumed to have resulted if there is a
decrease in both the target area and the buffer zone(s). Positive WDQ values indicate diffusion of benefit to the buffer zone and negative WDQ
values indicate geographical displacement of crime. Considering the WDQ values, a figure
of +1 indicates a diffusion of benefit where the burglary reduction in the buffer zone is
equal to that in the project area. A figure of –1 indicates a displacement where the burglary
reduction is entirely offset by increases in the buffer zone. A WDQ of zero represents a
scenario where there was apparently no change in the buffer zone, or where this change
could not be attributed to changes in the SDP. 
It is important to note that should displacement occur, there is not necessarily a one-to-one
relationship between the number of burglaries saved in one area and those displaced to
another. For instance, should an offender be prevented from targeting properties in an
affluent area and instead have to burgle those in a more deprived area, to receive the same
financial rewards it may be necessary to commit more offences in the latter area. Thus the
ratio of saved to displaced burglaries may be, for example, 1:2 or higher. For a variety of
reasons, including the one just discussed, it is possible that the WDQ obtained may be
greater than plus or minus one. 
To calculate WDQ values for the entire buffer zone and for each of the five smaller buffer
rings, it was necessary to calculate how many households were located in each buffer zone.
This was established using information from Address Point
5 and the GIS intersect command.
The WDQ for the entire buffer zone was –1.4, indicating that there was evidence of
displacement and that the change in the buffer zone exceeded that in the SDP. Thus, further
WDQs were computed for each of the buffer rings, these are shown in Figure 4.1. The
results show that whilst there was, in general, evidence of geographical displacement there
was also a diffusion of benefit in the buffer ring contiguous with the SDP boundary. The
greatest evidence of displacement was observed for the second buffer ring, the effect then
decreased in the subsequent rings, suggesting a possible distance decay effect.
18
5 The number of households was a proxy based upon the number of domestic postal delivery points, derived from
Ordnance Surveys Address Point data.Figure 4.1: Weighted displacement quotients for the five buffer rings
Finally, we computed a weighted displacement quotient to examine the potential
geographical displacement of burglary into the non-targeted area of the SDP. The value
obtained of -0.21 indicated that there was some evidence of displacement to this area but
that it was fairly limited.
Crime switch displacement
A further type of displacement that crime reduction schemes may cause is crime switch
displacement which occurs when offenders swap from undertaking burglary to committing
other types of crime in an area. Rather than focusing on all types of crime, for the purposes
of illustration, this section will consider the effects of SDP activity on four types of acquisitive
crime: ‘theft from a person’, ‘theft of a car’, ‘theft from a car’ and the ‘unauthorised taking
of a car’. These particular crimes were selected for the following reason. Felson and Clarke
(1998) have argued that opportunity plays a role in causing all crime and that according to
rational choice theory (e.g. see Cornish & Clarke, 1989) the goal of criminal behaviour is
to benefit the offender. Thus, it seems reasonable to suggest that following the removal of
opportunities for burglary, assuming that alternatives exist, offenders would seek to commit
the most similar type of crime and select the next most similar targets. In terms of alternative
types of crime that offenders may decide to commit, intuitively one would expect that those
listed above would represent some of the most likely candidates.
The first approach adopted here to examine the effects of SDP activity on crime-switch was to
simply consider the changes in the rates of these crimes over time. One problem with calculating
rates for crimes such as car theft is that of selecting an appropriate denominator. For instance,
whilst the selection of a denominator for (household) property crime is straightforward, this is not
necessarily the case for car crime. Ideally, one would use the number of cars that are, on
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1 234 5average, parked in an area. However, although there is data concerned with the number of
cars owned by residents that reside within a particular Enumeration District (ED) there are a
number of problems with the use of this data here. The main concern with the use of such a
denominator is that it is only available at the ED level, and the analyses conducted here are
concerned with effects at the sub-ED level (e.g. the SDP sub areas).
Thus, for practical reasons and to allow comparisons across different crime types (e.g.
burglary and car crime), we used the number of households as the denominator. Whilst we
recognise that this is not a perfect denominator we believe that it should suffice for the current
purposes. For purposes of illustration, Figures 4.2 and 4.3 show the crime rates for two of the
selected crime types, theft of and theft from car, for both the before and after SDP time periods.
Figure 4.2: Theft from car rates before and after the SDP began
Consideration of the data for the four types of crime considered revealed that the SDP
interventions appeared to have had a selective effect on the rates of other types of crime.
Thus, whilst theft from a motor vehicle (shown in Figure 4.2) actually showed a considerable
increase relative to the change observed in the comparison areas, theft from a person
decreased somewhat, particularly relative to the BCU and PFA, whereas the crime rates for
the unauthorized taking of a vehicle (not shown) and theft of car (shown in Figure 4.3)
seemed to have changed in a way that was generally consistent with the patterns observed
for the three types of comparison area.
Thus, the most striking effect appeared to be that observed for ‘theft from car’. For instance,
whilst the crime rate in the SDP was very similar to the rates for each of the three
comparison areas prior to the start of the scheme, it was considerably higher for the 24
months that followed the inception of the scheme, being approximately twice as high as it
was before the start of the scheme. Notably, the change experienced within the SDP was
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smost apparent for the three sub-areas in which the interventions were concentrated. In this
area the rate increased by a factor of three, whereas, and in contrast, the change in the
rates for the three comparison areas ranged from an increase of a factor of only 1.07 to
1.38. Similarly, the rate in the non-targeted area of the SDP only increased by a factor of
1.8. Hence, although there was a clear reduction for burglary in the area of the SDP in
which three of the initiatives were concentrated, this reduction appears to have been
accompanied by an increase in a different type of acquisitive crime, namely ‘theft from car’.
Thus, there appears to be persuasive evidence of crime-switch displacement as well as
geographical displacement. The above analyses could, of course, be supplemented by
consideration of the changes in a number of additional crime types, such as non-domestic
burglary. However, the purpose of this paper is to illustrate the kinds of analyses that are
possible rather than to conduct every possible analysis ourselves. 
Figure 4.3: Theft of car rates before and after the SDP began
Crime switch to theft from vehicle
The above analysis has shown some evidence of potential crime switch from burglary to
theft from car. In order to test whether or not this was a statistically significant effect, a beat
level analysis of change in the theft from vehicle rate was conducted in a similar way to that
described for burglary above. Changes in the theft from vehicle rate between the period
before and after scheme inception were calculated for each of the 289 beats with 1000 or
more residential properties in the Merseyside area.
As with the data for burglary, the distribution for these 'difference' scores for the 289 beats was
approximately normal. This time, however, the distribution had a mean of 3.8 and a standard
deviation of 17.61. Thus, on average there was a slight increase in the theft from vehicle rate
over time. To see if the change in the theft from vehicle rate in the SDP was significant relative to
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40the average change observed, z-scores were calculated for each beat. The two beats making up
the Liverpool SDP (beat codes C434 and C554) had z-scores of +1.71 and +3.43 respectively.
Both of these z scores were significant at the 5 per cent level (one-tailed). In fact these two beats
had the 14th and 3rd highest positive z- scores for all 289 beats. This shows a very significant
increase in theft from vehicle for both the SDP beats. Interestingly, the z-score produced for the
targeted area of the SDP alone was +3.10, which is not as significant as beat C554. 
For completeness, we also calculated a WDQ for this type of crime to examine the extent to
which crime-switch occurred. To do this, it was necessary to use a modified version of the
WDQ formula (see Appendix 1). That is, rather than comparing the change in the
distribution of one type of crime in two different areas relative to the PFA, we were
considering the change in two types of crime in one area relative to the PFA. As with the
above analyses, the total number of households was used as a denominator to calculate the
crime rates for car crime. For the entire SDP the WDQ was –19.3 indicating that the
increase in the theft from car rate greatly exceeded the change in the burglary rate. For the
targeted area of the SDP, the WDQ was –0.87, demonstrating that the change in the
burglary rate was similar to the increase in the theft from car rate. The results from the WDQ
thus also show that there was considerable evidence of crime switch.
A likely reason that may explain why crime switch appears to be most pronounced for this type of
crime is the fact that theft from a motor vehicle is probably the next most similar crime to burglary.
For instance, the skills required to commit these two types of crime are roughly equivalent, and
the types of goods acquired are likely to be similar both in terms of size and value, meaning that
the offender should be able to sell the goods through existing channels/contacts.
In contrast, the other crime types, such as theft of an automobile, are likely to require different
skills, involve different risks, and possibly involve selling the goods through different or even
new contacts. Thus, from the rational choice perspective it would seem to make sense that
offenders who perhaps specialise in committing burglaries would choose to steal from cars
should the availability of burglary opportunities become more limited or the risks increased.
However, a potentially puzzling aspect of the above results is that it can clearly be imputed
that both the WDQ and z-score analyses indicated that there was evidence of crime switch
within the non-targeted area of the SDP. Since evidence suggests that offenders commit
crimes within close vicinity of their home address (e.g. Wiles and Costello, 2000), one
plausible reason for this may be that whilst offenders may commit burglaries in a fairly
anonymous fashion (that is, once inside a property the likelihood of being identified is
relatively minimal) the same is unlikely to be true for acquisitive car crime. Thus, from a
22rational choice perspective, should crime-switch occur, it would make sense to commit car
crimes in areas that are just outside their own neighbourhood. In support of this, in a recent
study, Wiles and Costello (2000) reported that offenders tend to commit car crimes (in this
case, taking a vehicle without the owner’s consent) at a greater average distance from their
home address than they do burglaries (the mean distances were 2.36 and 1.88 miles
respectively). A further possibility is concerned with offenders’ knowledge of the operational
boundary of the scheme and their understanding of the initiatives being implemented.
Importantly, if offenders are simply aware that something is going on in the area, but are
not aware of the specifics of the intervention, then they may be more likely to avoid
committing any type of crime in that area, meaning that should crime-switch occur it would
perhaps be fairly prevalent in areas just outside the target area. Regardless of the
underlying cause of this effect, it seems plausible that this form of displacement may have a
geographical as well as offence specific component to it.
Furthermore, whilst changes in the burglary rate were only statistically significant at the 5 per
cent level for the sub-areas, the changes in the crime rate for car crime were significant for all
SDP areas (targeted, non-targeted and entire SDP). Thus, one may argue that since the
changes were always significant for car crime but not for burglary, it is difficult to attribute the
changes to crime-switch displacement. However, there are a number of reasons for believing
they are. First, there was evident selectivity in the patterns of change. Specifically, the actual
changes in crime rates, for both crime types, were greatest for the targeted area of the SDP,
and the changes observed in each of the comparison areas (i.e. the comparison area, the
BCU and the PFA) were almost non-existent or relatively small. Second, one reason why the
changes for car crime but not burglary were always significant may be due to a statistical
measurement or sensitivity issue. For example, to gain the same rewards as committing one
burglary, offenders may have to commit a number of car crimes. Thus, one burglary
prevented may lead to five or six incidents of theft from car. This means that although the
change in the burglary rate is small and difficult to detect, the change in the theft from car
rate would clearly be substantial. One way of examining this issue is to consider the findings
from the 2000 British Crime Survey (Kershaw et al., 2000) concerned with the average cost
of goods stolen for these two types of crime. The results indicate that the cost of goods stolen
for an average burglary is £1,273, whereas the average yield for theft from car is £202.
Thus, using a crude calculation, it would appear that offenders must commit at least six ‘theft
from car’ offences to reap the same rewards as one burglary. Given this gearing ratio, we
would anticipate that if crime switch did occur even a small reduction in the burglary rate
would result in a fairly substantial increase in car crime. Thus, statistically it may be easier to
detect changes in the latter even when changes in the former are less evident.
23Heat threshold grid square analysis
It is possible to investigate the relationship between burglary and theft from vehicle in more
detail by looking at the spatial distribution of these crime types within the SDP area. In order
to do this, the SDP area was separated into 100 metre grid squares. Counts of burglary and
theft from car were then calculated for each of these squares for the two-year period before
and the two-year period after the scheme's inception. These counts were then subtracted
from each other to produce a measure of change for each crime type. These changes were
then mapped and the results are shown in Figures 4.4 (for burglary) and 4.5 (for theft from
vehicle). For both of the figures, squares were shaded using a heat threshold technique.
Thus, red or brown squares indicate that the count of crime increased between the two
periods, whereas those shaded in blue represent areas where there was a reduction.
Squares that are shaded white are those in which the crime rate did not change between
the two periods. Figure 4.4 shows that, as expected, many of the squares within or nearby
the three targeted sub-areas show reductions in the count of burglary. In contrast, Figure 4.5
shows that there were increases in theft from vehicle in these three sub-areas over the same
period of time.
24Figure 4.4: Changes in the distribution of burglary before and after scheme inception
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Target switch
The third type of displacement to be considered is that of target switch, which is said to
have occurred if offenders avoid properties that they may have otherwise targeted had the
properties not been subject to crime reduction activity. Furthermore, offenders instead select
the next available properties within the scheme boundary. For instance, if it is likely that
number 10 on a particular road has received security upgrades as part of a target
hardening scheme, but numbers 12–100 probably have not, then offenders may target
these untreated properties instead.
Figure 4.6: Reduction in burglary rates for different groups of property
To examine this issue we calculated the number of burglaries that were committed at
properties that were and were not subject to crime reduction activity within the SDP. Next
we computed the change in the rates for these different groups of properties over the before
and after time periods. Rather than presenting the data as a simple percentage change
figure, we standardised the index of change as a function of the change observed for the
houses that were subject to crime reduction activity. Figure 4.6 shows the reduction in the
rate of burglary for six different types of area: the treated properties and the untreated
properties located within the SDP sub areas, the remainder of the SDP boundary not subject
to situational crime reduction measures, the comparison area, the BCU and the PFA. As the
index of change was calculated as a function of the change observed in the treated
properties, the index for these properties was set to –100(%). The Figure shows that the non-
targeted properties in the near vicinity of those that were treated (i.e. those within the three
smaller sub-areas shown in Figure 1) experienced a large percentage reduction in their
overall burglary rate relative to the treated properties. In fact, these properties saw almost
as much of a decrease (95 per cent) as the treated properties themselves. There was also a
slight reduction in the non-targeted part of the SDP (those outside the three sub-areas in
Figure 1.1) but this was not on the scale of the non-targeted properties within the sub-areas.
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targeted areaIn addition, this drop was not as large as that seen in the remainder of the PFA (PFA–SDP).
The changes in both the comparison area and the BCU were actually positive (to differing
degrees), indicating that relative to the treated properties there was an actual increase in
risk in these two areas, rather than the slower decrease observed in the other areas. 
It therefore appears from the graph that the non-targeted properties within the sub-areas
benefited from the fact that they were located nearby to houses that had received treatment.
This represents evidence of diffusion of benefit, and suggests that the possibility of target
switch to other properties within the intervention areas is unlikely. It also appears that the
diffusion of benefit is fairly localised in its nature because there was far less of a (relative)
reduction in the burglary rate in the part of the SDP outside the three sub-areas. This is likely
to be demonstrating a spatial proximity effect, suggesting that offenders are aware that
crime reduction activity is happening in the area but are not sure which specific houses
have been targeted and therefore avoid all houses in the immediate area of the intervention.
This has clear implications for the planning of crime reduction initiatives, particularly for
maximising the effects of limited resources.
2829
5. Effectiveness of interventions 
Measuring the effects of a single intervention
This section considers the effectiveness of individual interventions by examining the changes
in the burglary rate for protected properties over time. It begins by using information on the
actual location of target-hardened properties within the Liverpool SDP area to illustrate the
methodology developed and then proceeds to consider the effectiveness of the other
interventions. The address of each property that received target-hardening was supplied by
the SDP team. These were then allocated easting and northing co-ordinates using Address
Point information (a geographical database). Briefly, the addresses were cleaned and
rewritten in Address Point structure and then matched with the Address Point data in a GIS,
using the unique combination of house number and postcode, fields that were common to
both files. These data were then mapped using a GIS. Visual inspection of the map revealed
that the target-hardened properties were almost exclusively located within the three sub-
areas of the SDP. 
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of target hardening in reducing burglary, the
information on the location of target-hardened properties needed to be cross-referenced with
information on burglaries occurring at these addresses. The most accurate method of
achieving this was by restructuring the burglary data in the same format as the target
hardening information. A FORTRAN program was therefore produced that re-formatted
burglaries into Address Point format. Then, using address-matching software produced for
the evaluation, the recorded crime and target-hardening databases were searched and any
burglaries that had occurred in target-hardened properties were identified. Each of the
burglaries had date information attached to them, which enabled a count to be produced of
the number of burglaries against target-hardened properties that had occurred before and
after inception of the Liverpool SDP scheme.
Table 5.1 summarises the raw count of incidents both before and after the SDP became
active (simply searching for incidents before and after 1st April 1999). Although results
shown in Table 5.1 are produced on an individual level, to preserve anonymity the
information was aggregated to give the total number of times that all target hardened
properties were victimised before and after locks were fitted. Table 5.1: Domestic burglaries and repeats in target hardened properties before and
after SDP became active
Count of incidents
Before SDP (Apr 97-Mar 99 inclusive) 55
After SDP (Apr 99-Mar 01 inclusive) 62
Table 5.1 shows that the total number of burglary incidents appears to have actually
increased in the target hardened properties since inception of the SDP. At first sight, this
seems to indicate that the target-hardening scheme was not effective in reducing burglaries.
However, it is important to note that it is not possible to assume that all of the target-
hardened properties received their measures by 1 April 1999. In fact, a simple analysis of
the data revealed that the implementation of the target-hardening intervention occurred over
a fairly long time period (between 13 April 1999 and 30 September 2000). The most
active period of target hardening took place between 1 March 2000 and 14 August 2000,
during which time 75 per cent of the properties were target-hardened. Thus, it was likely
that the analyses presented in Table 5.1 may have been misleading. For this reason, we
conducted further analyses using data concerned with the date on which the target
hardening of each property took place.
Thus, in order to produce a more sensitive analysis, each of the properties were tracked
individually to establish how many of the 62 burglaries carried out after the inception of the
scheme had occurred in properties before their individual date of target hardening and how
many had occurred after this date. Table 5.2 reveals that in fact, 43 of the 62 burglaries
occurred at properties before they were target-hardened; only 19 occurred in target-
hardened properties. 
One potential problem with this analysis as presented so far, is that it does not compare like
with like in terms of the time periods that elapsed before and after target hardening. For
example, if a property was target hardened on 13 April 1999 it will have more opportunity
to be burgled before 31 March 2001 than a property that was target hardened on 30
September 2000. In order to control for this, the number of days between 1 April 1997 and
the date of target hardening and the number of days between this and 31 March 2001
were calculated for each property. This information was used to produce statistics on the
total number of days for which the entire group of target-hardened properties were
unprotected (by adding together the ‘before’ periods for all properties) and the total number
of days for which they were protected (by adding together the ‘after’ periods). This data
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was then used as a denominator to produce a standardised rate which controlled for the
period of victimisation opportunity for each household. These ‘opportunity dependent
incident counts’ are shown in Table 5.2. The results demonstrate that, even when differences
in victimisation opportunity have been accounted for, there is a difference in the number of
incidents happening before and after target hardening. In fact, target-hardened households
were at almost half of the risk of unprotected houses in the same area. This is a particularly
important finding given that research consistently demonstrates that victimisation predicts
future risk (e.g. see Pease, 1998), and the fact that part of the selection criteria for target
hardening included identifying previously victimised households. Thus, ordinarily the target-
hardened properties would be precisely those that would be expected to be at a heightened
rather than reduced risk. These results suggest that the target hardening intervention had
been successful.
Table 5.2: Revised table examining burglaries that happened after inception date in
relation to their individual target hardening date
Count of incidents Number of days for all Opportunity dependent
target hardened properties  count of incidents
Before TH 98 394665 24.83*
After TH 19 135285 14.04*
*To ease interpretation these are scaled up by 100,000
A further extension to this methodology is the translation of the information presented in
Table 5.2 into a quantification of the outcome of the particular intervention from the point
of view of the number of burglaries reduced or prevented by the measures taken. Table 5.3
shows the steps taken to calculate this outcome. As demonstrated above, the first stage was
to produce opportunity-dependent counts of incidents. In this case, the counts have been
scaled to relate to a ‘virtual year’ for the properties concerned, which produces slightly
different results from those in Table 5.2, which used a different scaling factor. This ‘virtual
year’ is calculated by multiplying the number of target hardened properties by the number
of days in a year. For the 363 target hardened properties therefore, 132495 days makes
up a virtual year. This scaling was undertaken because it was sensible to have a
meaningful period of analysis for the production of outcomes. In order to produce
outcomes, the number of burglaries occurring after target hardening required comparison
with an expected rate. An expected rate was produced by taking into account changes in
the wider PFA over time. Therefore;(Note that the area used is the Police Force Area minus the Basic Command Unit which
contains the SDP in order to avoid confounding this ratio by including areas possibly
affected by the activity of the SDP scheme).
Table 5.3: Outcomes for target hardening scheme
Count of Number of Opportunity Average Expected no No
incidents days for all dependent PFA-BCU of burglaries burglaries
target count of count for after prevented
hardened incidents quarters by scheme
properties  before and
after target
hardening
Before 98 394665 32.90* 2510
TH
After 19 135285 18.61* 2407 31.55 12.94
TH
* These are for virtual years (132,495 days for 363 households)
This expected rate therefore reflects what we might expect the incident count to be if nothing
occurred in the SDP. That is, if the proportion of burglaries committed in the PFA that were
concentrated in the SDP remained stable over time. In order to calculate the outcome (or the
number of burglaries saved by the scheme) in Table 5.3 the observed number of burglaries
occurring after target hardening was simply subtracted from the expected number. Table 5.3
therefore shows a saving of 13 burglaries in one (virtual) year for the 363 properties
involved in the intervention.
Measuring the effects of multiple interventions
So far in this section, the analysis of outcomes at the individual level has only investigated
the effect of target hardening on levels of burglary. The reality is that other initiatives, such
as smartwater and alleygating may also have an effect at this level. Furthermore, some of
the households that had been target-hardened were also protected by smartwater and/or
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Average PFA count before target hardening  
Average PFA count after target hardening 
number of burglaries
in properties before 
 target hardening
Expected burglaries =  xalleygating. In order to try to separate out the effects of these interventions, a database was
produced that contained all of the households that had been involved in at least one of
these three interventions. For each household, there was a dummy variable that indicated
whether the property had been target hardened, smart-watered or alleygated and data
concerned with the dates on which these measures had been installed. 
Using the address matching software, this database was then matched against individual
burglary data for the period between 1 April 1997 and 31 March 2001. In a similar
method to that described above, the date of each burglary was compared with the date of
installation of the measures taken at each property. Table 5.4 below shows the results of this
analysis. The table shows that overall there were 500 individual households that had been
treated by at least one intervention. The most common situation was that properties were
target hardened without any other treatment (168 properties). There was also a substantial
amount of cases in which properties received both target hardening and smartwater (136
properties). Less common were individual properties that had received all three interventions
(31 properties), alleygating and target hardening (28 properties) or alleygating and
smartwater (7 properties). The number of burglaries saved by each of the combinations of
treatment was calculated using the opportunity dependent rate method described above. As
above, these outcomes were calculated for a ‘virtual year’ for that number of households.
For example, for alleygating there were 76 treated properties, which meant that a virtual
year would be equivalent to 76*365 = 27740 days. The savings shown in Table 5.4
should therefore be taken as being for a virtual year for the particular number of properties
receiving that combination of interventions. 
By adding up the outcomes, it can be seen that overall across the different combinations of
interventions, there was a saving of approximately 12 burglaries. It is interesting to
compare the different savings across the different types of treatment. It appears from Table
5.4 that undertaking target hardening, either on its own or in combination with one or more
other intervention, appears to be a particularly effective treatment. In fact, according to the
figures target hardening on its own appears to be more effective than using it in
combination with other measures. However, this may be due to the fact that more
households received target hardening alone than those using combinations of measures. The
two combinations of interventions that appeared least effective was smartwater alone,
which showed an increase of 2.49 burglaries over the expected rate, and alleygating and
Smartwater, which showed no change, although the number of cases in the latter category
(7 properties) was too small for reliable analysis.
33Table 5.4: Outcomes for different types of treatment
Type of No of Count of Number of Opportunity Average Expected Burglaries
treatment hhlds incidents days elapsed dependent PFA-BCU burglaries saved by 
count of  count of after scheme
incidents incidents
Alleygating
Before 76 19 87856 6.00 2510
5.75 0.95
After 76 4 23104 4.80 2407
Virtual yr = 27740
Target hardening
Before 168 52 182845 17.44 2510
16.72 6.9
After 168 10 62435 9.82 2407
Virtual yr = 61320
Smartwater
Before 54 7 61836 2.23 2510
2.14 -2.49
After 54 4 17004 4.63 2407
Virtual yr =19710
Alleygating and 
target hardening
Before 28 7 30789 2.32 2510 2.22 1.21
After 28 1 10091 1.01 2407
Virtual yr =12045
Alleygating
and Smartwater
Before 7 0 7471 0 2510 0 0
After 7 0 2749 0 2407
Virtual yr= 2555
Target hardening 
and Smartwater
Before 136 30 148291 10.04 2510 9.63 2.71
After 136 7 50239 6.92 2407
Virtual yr = 49640
All 3 interventions
Before 31 9 32740 3.11 2510
2.98 2.08
After 31 1 12520 0.90 2407
Virtual yr = 11315
Overall
Before 500 124 551828 41.01 2510
39.33 11.67
After 500 27 178142 27.66 2407
Virtual yr = 182500
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6. The influence of other initiatives
An important final consideration in assessing the impact of the RBI is the role played by
other crime reduction and regeneration initiatives that are operating in the area. The SDP
target area was originally chosen so that it would not co-incide with the European Union
Objective 1 areas. In doing so, it was ensured that the SDP did not overlap with areas in
which the Safer Merseyside Partnership, a nine-year crime reduction programme, was
operational. However, there is the possibility that other crime reduction efforts, such as those
of Merseyside Police Force and those laid out in the Crime and Disorder strategies for the
district of Liverpool, might have some impact on burglary rates in the target area. For this
reason, information concerning such schemes was collected. Some of these had a
community safety element and their geographical boundary covered both the Liverpool and
Merseyside areas. Thus, it is possible that some of these projects could have had a potential
effect on the crime rates within and nearby the Liverpool SDP area. For instance, a Health
Action Zone parenting support project and a youth exclusion project had a city-wide remit,
and hence both operated in the SDP area. Furthermore, a Streetsafe police initiative and the
Dingle Community Regeneration team project's CCTV initiative also operate in the SDP
area. All the schemes mentioned above were implemented at least partially within the
timescale of the Liverpool SDP. It is difficult to assess the effect of these schemes on crime
rates within the SDP area without having specific information on the inputs and outputs for
these schemes. However, since all the schemes mentioned above were implemented across
wide areas of the city of Liverpool, it is reasonable to assume that the BCU, the comparison
area and the buffer zones that have been used in the analyses described here would all
have been affected by these initiatives. This means that to a certain degree the influence of
other initiatives was controlled for in the analyses. It would be more problematic if any of
the other crime reduction initiatives had focused on a far smaller geographical area of
which the SDP (but not the comparison areas, or vice versa) was a part.3637
7. Concluding remarks
This paper has illustrated the power of disaggregate data analysis in the evaluation of the
effectiveness of burglary reduction schemes, and has shown that the use of aggregate level
information alone may produce misleading results. It has also presented new methods for
quantifying the outcomes of such schemes. These methods include new techniques for
measuring changes in the burglary rate, assigning statistical significance to such changes,
assessing the degree to which action causes crime displacement and a way of isolating
burglary reduction outcomes that can be attributable to specific interventions undertaken. 
The authors would like to emphasise that it should be possible to use techniques such as those
described above to assess both the impact of burglary reduction schemes in other areas,
and, in some cases, the impact of other crime reduction schemes. For instance, similar
techniques could be used to assess the statistical significance of schemes aimed at reducing
car crime or reducing crime through CCTV surveillance. The ability to undertake any such
ventures relies on the availability of accurate, individual level recorded crime information. 
Considering the scheme used to illustrate the techniques presented here, whilst the purpose
of this paper was to focus on the methods developed, some discussion of the scheme itself
and relevant policy implications is clearly warranted. However, before discussing the
effectiveness of the scheme it is necessary to comment on the implementation of the
interventions. Considering the target hardening and property marking initiatives, these were
successfully implemented within the time period studied. And, analyses of the dates on
which target-hardening surveys took place indicated that the majority did so immediately
after a burglary, illustrating that the targeting strategy employed was efficient. In addition,
since research (see Pease, 1998) illustrates that the majority of repeat incidents of burglary
occur swiftly, the approach adopted would have ensured that properties were protected
during the period that they were most vulnerable. Thus, the effectiveness of the scheme was
not compromised by an inappropriate targeting strategy.
In contrast, the alley-gating scheme was not fully realised during the evaluation period and
this will undoubtedly have had an impact on the effectiveness of the scheme. As noted
above, because of legal reasons only ten of the intended 69 gates were fitted during the
period considered. These gates secured one block of 125 houses. Problems were also
experienced by the offender-based scheme, as follows. First, due to initial problems in
recruiting a police officer, the scheme did not become operational until January 2000.Second, for the above period, only six offenders had participated in the scheme. Third, all of
the offenders who took part in the scheme had recently been released from prison on licence.
Thus, it is plausible that the offenders operating in the target area for both the pre- and post-
implementation periods did not actually take part in the scheme. Thus, it is difficult to see how
the scheme could have had an effect on the behaviour of those offenders who were
responsible for the crime rate in the target area within the time period studied. Finally, for
these and other reasons, it is worth noting that behaviour modification programmes may well
require a much longer period than situational crime reduction initiatives to produce reliable
and/or sustainable effects, and thus it is our opinion that whilst this intervention may have
produced reliable results in terms of changing the behaviour of the offenders who took part in
the scheme, it is unlikely to have impacted upon the crime rate in the SDP at this stage.
Notwithstanding these initial implementation problems, the analyses presented above
suggest that, to some extent at least, the scheme was successful in reducing the burglary rate
in the targeted area. Although the reduction observed across the entire SDP was statistically
non-significant, the change apparent in the three sub-areas in which the situational crime
reduction measures were geographically focused clearly was. In terms of repeat
victimisation, there was a clear reduction across the entire SDP, although this again was
most evident in the three targeted sub-areas.
Considering the time period during which the scheme appeared to be most effective, perhaps
not surprisingly this appears to have occurred during the most intensive implementation phase
of the scheme (see Figure 2.3). However, the crime rate rose steeply in the final quarter of the
evaluation period. Assuming that this was a reliable increase, this may suggest two
possibilities regarding the mechanism through which the scheme had an effect. First, it is
possible that the effect was simply not sustainable and that offenders discovered methods of
circumventing the measures taken. Alternatively, it is possible that the change in the SDP may
have been attributable to a realisation on the part of offenders that ‘something’ was going on
(or was about to) in the target area which would affect the risk of being caught, an effect
generally referred to as the ‘Hawthorne effect’ (see Mayo, 1933; see also Smith et al,
forthcoming). In this latter case, the reduction observed would be assumed to result from a
change in offenders’ perceptions of the risks involved in committing crimes in the area, rather
than because of the actual difficulty in gaining access to the protected properties. In support
of this possibility, in a forthcoming book chapter that considers the role of the Hawthorne
effect in crime reduction schemes, Smith et al report that of the 52 evaluations considered, 40
per cent showed evidence of a reduction in the crime rate in advance of the physical
implementation of the interventions, an effect that Smith et al refer to as an anticipatory
benefit. Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of the current paper to determine which of the
38two explanations (if not both) is valid here. To do so would involve the analysis of the crime
rate over a much extended time period, and would also preferably involve the interviewing of
offenders who operate in the target area. However, recent work undertaken by the authors
has highlighted a fairly substantial amount of evidence that publicity does have an important
role to play in crime reduction (see Johnson and Bowers, forthcoming). 
Irrespective of the mechanism that caused the reduction in the burglary rate, it is apparent
from the analyses presented above that this reduction appears to have been coincident with
two types of displacement (geographical and crime switch) and three types of diffusion of
benefit (geographical, repeat victimisation and target-switch). The fact that there was both a
diffusion of benefit as well as displacement is an interesting finding with important (policy
and theoretical) implications. The following paragraphs will discuss these different patterns
in turn, beginning with the geographical effects.
Analyses of the change in the burglary rates for the five buffer zones indicated that for the
first buffer ring there was a diffusion of benefit, with houses within this zone experiencing a
reduction in the risk of burglary relative to their previous risk. One reason for this may be
the result of offenders realising that something was going on in the general area but not
being aware of the exact boundary of the scheme. This is an important finding as it
suggests that the preventive effects of situational crime reduction measures may extend to
unprotected houses within close proximity of a scheme. This possibility is given strong
support by the finding presented in Figure 4.6 which showed that within the targeted area
of the SDP, the non-target hardened properties experienced almost an equivalent reduction
in the risk of victimisation to those that received target-hardening measures. Thus, the
possibility exists that the effectiveness of many situational crime reduction interventions may
be increased by adopting targeting strategies that give the illusion of a greater area of
coverage. This may be achieved in a variety of ways including the use of disinformation to
offenders, or the use of more diffuse scheme boundaries.
Considering geographical displacement, it was apparent that following the start of the
scheme the burglary rate in the second buffer zone increased dramatically but that the
increase observed across successive buffer zones declined, conforming to a distance decay
pattern. Thus, if it can be assumed that these changes were the result of displacement, in
line with findings concerned with offenders travel to crime patterns (e.g. Wiles and Costello,
2000), and the familiarity decay theory of Eck (1993), it would appear that when offenders
avoided the SDP they tended to target properties located only a short distance away from
the scheme area, but not those immediately adjacent to the SDP. One possible reason why
geographical displacement appears to have been so evident may be due to the fact that the
39scheme was geographically concentrated into relatively small areas, thereby meaning that,
for offenders, the effort involved in selecting alternative targets (e.g. those 500m away)
would have been relatively minimal. If this is the case, then had the resources been
distributed just as intensively but over a larger area, evidence of geographical displacement
may not have been so apparent. However, unfortunately this remains speculation and
further research would seem to be warranted. 
Nevertheless, taken together, these findings may provide useful insights into how scarce
resources might be geographically targeted. For instance, one approach might involve
defining geographical concentric rings (or other geographies) and to deploy measures in
some areas but not others. On the basis of the above findings, it may be the case that
targeting one ring would produce a diffusion of benefit that would reduce the risk of
burglary in the subsequent area. However, this may heighten the risk to properties located
in the next area, and thus it would make sense to target resources into this area. By
adopting this, or a variant of such a strategy it may be possible to protect many more
houses than those that receive situational crime reduction measures, thereby increasing the
cost effectiveness of limited resources. This possibility needs further investigation and issues
such as the ratio of treated to untreated houses necessary to cause this effect would need to
be established through evaluated trails.
Another interesting finding reported above was the apparent reduction in the risk of repeat
victimisation both within the targeted and non-targeted areas of the SDP. Within the targeted
area, this may be attributed to offenders being deterred from attempting to burgle previously
victimised properties following the discovery that the physical security of those properties
had been improved. However, since target-hardening was almost exclusively focused within
the targeted area of the SDP, this explanation simply cannot account for the change
observed in the non-targeted part of the SDP. Thus, it is plausible that the change in the risk
of repeat victimisation within the latter area was attributable to a diffusion of benefit,
whereby offenders perceived that the effort involved in targeting previously victimised
properties exceeded the likely benefits. This finding is particularly important given that
research (e.g. Johnson et al, 1997) consistently demonstrates that, in general, the risk of
victimisation effectively doubles following an initial burglary.
With respect to crime-switch displacement the findings were much more negative, with there
being significant evidence of this form of displacement. Specifically, for the four types of
acquisitive crime considered, it was clear that the rate for one of these, theft from car,
increased significantly and at a rate that exceeded that observed across the rest of the
police force area. As discussed above, offenders may have chosen to increase their
40activities in this type of crime as in many ways it represents the most similar alternative to
burglary. Although it would be useful to replicate this result before drawing any firm
conclusions, one clear implication of this finding is that when implementing crime reduction
schemes it is important to anticipate how an intervention might change an offender’s
criminal activities, and attempt to simultaneously reduce opportunities for alternative types of
crime. For instance, adopting a more holistic approach such as using CCTV cameras in
concert with target-hardening may have a greater and more pervasive effect than any single
type of intervention.
One important consideration in any attempt to reduce crime through the implementation of
an initiative is the degree to which such activity is cost effective. In the context of the RBI
discussed in this paper, this issue has warranted a complete research project in itself, the
results of which are given in detail elsewhere (Mallender et al, 2002). However, it is worth
briefly voicing some concerns regarding the cost effectiveness of the current scheme at this
point. The results above have shown that the measures adopted prevented 12 burglaries at
treated properties in the scheme area over the course of the intervention. The Home Office
gives a mean cost of a burglary at £1,273. However, when all costs associated with the
anticipation of crime, as a consequence of crime and in response to crime are accounted
for, the average cost of a burglary becomes £2,300. A question that follows from this asks
whether this reduction of 12 burglaries is enough to justify the cost of all the measures and
their implementation, the geographical displacement and the displacement to other types of
crime that have been observed. 
In economic terms, before considering the costs of displacement, and considering only the
situational measures of alley-gating, target hardening and smartwater, the results look quite
positive. Mallender et al (2002) show that the number of burglaries that would need to be
prevented to make this combination of interventions break-even financially would be nine for
the Liverpool scheme. However, these calculations omit the offender-based scheme, which
was far more expensive to implement. In addition, break-even costs have yet to be calculated
that take any displacement and diffusion of benefit into account. The results presented above
indicate that the added costs of displaced crimes might be quite substantial.
However, the cost effectiveness of a scheme is not the only consideration that needs to be
made. It is more difficult, for instance, to put a price on fear of crime and how much this
may have been influenced by the preventative measures taken. Furthermore there are issues
of equity and territorial justice that should be considered. For instance, displacement can be
seen as being of value to those who have avoided victimisation (e.g. Barnes, 1995). Barr
and Pease (1990) use the phrase ‘benign’ displacement to characterise crime-switch to
41alternative crimes that may be less serious than those prevented. Burglaries may also be
displaced into lower crime neighbours, which would even-out the distribution of crime and
make it (arguably) more equitable. It is evident that further studies are required to answer
the question of whether such crime reduction projects are truly worthwhile, and how it is
possible to quantify the value of, for instance, reducing fear of crime. 
The main purpose of the current paper was to illustrate some new (and some not so new)
techniques that may be used in the evaluation of crime reduction schemes. However, the
findings reported provide useful insights into the effects of such schemes, particularly in
relation to displacement/diffusion of benefit. Whilst displacement is clearly a negative side-
effect of crime reduction activity, it is important to understand how and when it occurs, only
then can we attempt to do something about it. However, to do this it is necessary to be able
to quantify or describe such a phenomenon in a systematic way, using techniques such as
those describe here, so that the results of independent studies can be directly compared. It is
our hope that more research will be conducted to address this issue so that the results may
be used to inform policy, rather than to be used as a reason not to implement situational
crime reduction measures.
A final point to note is that there are many different techniques available for use in
evaluation of crime reduction projects. This report has given a quantitative angle on such
evaluation, and has focused on the ways in which secondary data can be used to answer
questions such as “did crime reduce”. It has gone into less detail regarding the mechanism
by which crime is reduced in certain areas, and the characteristics of the areas where
schemes were successful in terms of their contextual makeup (e.g. socio-economic variables)
and the process by which the scheme was implemented. These are important concerns of
evaluation research, and have been addressed by researchers from the Northern
Consortium area elsewhere. 
42Appendix 1 Formula for the weighted 
displacement quotient
In a forthcoming paper (Bowers and Johnson, in press) we review the extant literature
concerned with the displacement of crime and diffusion of benefits. In particular, we discuss
the techniques that have been used to measure these phenomenon and the potential
problems associated with these methods. Consequently, we present a new standardized
technique, the weighted displacement quotient (WDQ), which can be used to measure
either phenomena. The rationale and assumptions underlying this technique are presented in
full in the forthcoming paper. However, to enable evaluators to use this technique now, the
equation for the WDQ is presented below. 
Formula for the weighted displacement quotient
The equation used for comparing the rate in the buffer to the police force area is given by:
Rate in (buffer zone)/rate in (PFA- buffer zone - SDP) (1.1)
The index is then weighted using a measure that compares the rate in the target area to that
in the police force area:
Rate in SDP/Rate in (PFA-buffer zone-SDP) (1.2)
Giving a weighted measure of:
Rate in (buffer zone)/rate in (PFA-buffer -SDP) (1.3)
Rate in SDP/Rate in (PFA-buffer zone-SDP)
However, in its current form this index only looks at the differing proportions in the various
areas at one time point. And, consequently, as the term ‘rate in (PFA-buffer zone-SDP)’
appears in both the numerator and denominator components of the equation for the same
time point, it cancels itself out. In order to detect displacement, the situation after the crime
reduction scheme became active needs to be compared with the situation before. If
displacement has occurred we would expect the numerator of the equation above to
increase over time and the denominator to decrease – in other words for the scheme to be
43successful and the proportion of crime committed in the buffer zone to increase. If the
scheme is not successful, theoretically we would not expect to observe any evidence of
displacement or diffusion of benefit, and hence it is unlikely that any change in the buffer
zone can be attributed to activity within the scheme. Therefore, if there is no indication of a
reduction in crime within the SDP it is inappropriate to attempt to interpret any changes in
terms of potential displacement or diffusion of benefit.
In order to look at changes in proportions over time the weighted displacement quotient
compares the situation after implementation (t1) with the situation before (t0) using the
following formula:
Note that in this formulation of the equation, the term ‘(PFA-buffer zone-SDP)’ no longer
cancels itself out as it did in equation 1.3.
Further details regarding the WDQ technique may be obtained from the authors, email:
kjb@liverpool.ac.uk or S.D.Johnson@liverpool.ac.uk.
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{Rate in (buffer)/rate in (PFA-buffer-SDP)}t1- {Rate in (buffer)/rate in (PFA-buffer-SDP)}t0
{Rate in SDP/Rate in (PFA-buffer-SDP)}t1 - {Rate in SDP/Rate in (PFA-buffer-SDP)}t0
(1.4)Appendix 2 Counts of single and repeat 
incidents of crime
Area Before After
Single Repeat Single Repeat
SDP Targeted 129 13 87 5
SDP not targeted 342 37 350 27
SDP 471 50 437 31
Comparison 285 30 316 39
BCU–SDP 183 18 183 19
PFA–SDP 23700 1977 21998 1861
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